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Objectives
Regression Analysis
 Estimate consumers’ WTP for dairy products produced using practices consistent with “humane animal care“ 
principles.
 Evaluate difference between two uniform price auction mechanisms (2nd price Vickrey auction and random Nth price 
Vickrey auction) and Open Ended Choice Experiments (OECE) in a non-hypothetical setting
 Evaluate the effect of information treatment on consumer behavior
 Estimate demand schedule, rather than a conventional WTP for 1 unit of a good, using OECE as well as Uniform 
Price Auctions 
 Evaluate the effect of posted prices on participant behavior under uniform price auctions.
 Examine the effects of having multiple “bidding” rounds on participant behavior
 Bidding behaviors under Random Nth price auctions and 2nd price Vickrey auctions seem to differ statistically 
significantly for cheese but not for ice cream.  This result is confirmed in nonparametric test (Wilcoxon Rank-Sum 
test) and in Tobit regression.
 Nonparametric tests as well as Tobit regressions suggest that information treatment had a significant effect in 
OECE, but not in Vickrey auctions.
 In Vickrey auctions posting all bids vs. posting only top N or top 2 bids had a significant effect on cheese bids but 
not on ice cream bids. 
 Bidding across rounds differed significantly in OECE mechanism but not in Vickey auctions
 There was no significant difference in male vs. female bids.
Conclusions
Introduction
 Debates about animal welfare in agricultural production have been increasing ( Norwood and Lusk, 2009).  Animal 
rights groups advocate for improved animal care.  Livestock industry tends to dismiss the arguments as emotional and 
lacking scientific basis.  Numerous publications highlighting the debate between the two sides have surfaced including 
but not limited to the report by the Pew Commission on Industrial Farm Animal Production (2008) and consequent 
response from The American Veterinary Medical Association (2009).
 Rollin (2003) as well as FAO (2009) discusses several dimensions of animal welfare in dairy production.  Examples are, 
early separation of calf and mother, heat stress (some farmers provide shade and cooling with sprinklers), ample space, 
waste removal, flooring that reduces slippage, comfortable bedding, grazing on pasture, etc.  
 While political and legislative efforts are ongoing, it is important to understand and reflect the impact of ethical 
dimensions of production, like consistency of agricultural production  practices with “animal welfare” considerations, 
on consumer demand (Frank, 2006)
 A handful of studies have addressed public perceptions (Lusk and Norwood, 2008) and willingness to pay for 
improved animal care in agricultural production using hypothetical choice experiments (Liljenstolpe, 2008;  Carlsson et 
al. 2007) .
 To the best of our knowledge there have been no other known published studies which estimate consumer willingness 
to pay (WTP) for animal welfare attributes in agricultural production using non-hypothetical experimental methods, 
and there have been no studies on consumer WTP for animal welfare attributes in dairy industry.
Data Description
Nonparametric Test – P values
Experimental Design
 All participants (218) were paid $30 for participating 
 Participants played for “Humane” Ice Cream, and “Humane” Cheese
 Conventional Ice Cream and Conventional Cheese were available for purchase after each experiment session at the 
going market prices ($0.25/scoop of ice cream, and $0.5 per cheese unit) 
 Non-hypothetical experimental methods were used to elicit  consumers’ willingness to pay.  Specifically, we used 
Uniform Price Vickrey Auctions (UPVA) and Open Ended Choice Experiments (OECE)
• UPVA: In this mechanism, the participants submit bids for different quantities of the goods in five rounds. On 
the provided sheet they are asked to write their bids for each amount and submit at the end of each round. Total 
of five rounds were played in the real auction.  Two mechanisms of UVPA that were used in this study are:
• 2nd price Vickrey Auction – Highest bidder is declared as the winner and pays the price equal to the second 
highest bid (List and Shogren, 1999; Knetsch and Tang, 2001; Corrigan and Rousu, 2006)
• Random Nth price Vickrey Auction – Binding price is selected to be the randomly determined Nth highest 
bid.  Top N-1 bidders pay the binding price (Rousu et al. 2004; Shogren et al. 2001)
• OECE: In this mechanism, the participants are presented with several different price combinations and are asked 
to indicate how many units they would like to purchase at each of these prices. A binding price is selected 
randomly, and everyone is expected to purchase the amount they indicated for the binding price (Corrigan et al. 
2009).  One of the five rounds is selected as binding
• In each mechanism the binding product was randomly determined for each round.
• Each mechanism had informed and uninformed treatment groups
2nd Price Vickrey Nth Price Vickrey OECE
Variables
Participants: 79 Participants: 83 Participants: 56
Median Mean S. D.  Median Mean S. D.  Median Mean S. D. 
Trust Scores 4 3.993671 0.893329 4 3.777108 0.914827 4 3.6375 1.045608
Age 23 27.8481 11.76271 23 29.95181 12.90481 23 27.30357 11.87039
Individual Income* 1 1.78481 1.823429 1 1.759036 1.91649 1.5 1.589286 1.592902
Family Income* 3 4.177215 4.075441 4 4.096386 3.617756 2.5 3.607143 3.148902
Category Percentage 
Gender Male 43.04% 36.14% 41.07%
Female 56.96% 63.86% 58.93%
Formal Education Up to high School 3.8% 1.2% 0%
Associate Degree/ College  72.15% 72.29% 69.64%
Post graduate 24.05% 26.51% 24.05%
Awareness About 
animal welfare
No 8.86% 19.28% 41.07%
Yes 91.94% 80.72% 58.93%
Belief on super 
quality of animal 
welfare products
Yes 43.04% 40.96% 42.86%
No 56.96% 59.04% 57.14%
Mean and Median WTP (4th Round) 
2nd Price Vickrey Nth Price Vickrey OECE
2 Price Posted All Prices Posted N Prices Posted All Prices Posted All Posted
Ice Cream Cheese Ice Cream Cheese  Ice Cream Cheese  Ice Cream  Cheese Ice Cream Cheese
Informed 
Group
Median 0.1 0.25 0.25 0.2 0.25 0.5
Mean 0.252222 0.34037 0.311724 0.227586 0.484783 0.739583
S. D. 0.264245 0.292042 0.290813 0.235988 0.438861 0.544135
Uninformed 
Group
Median 0.225 0.25 0.375 0.275 0.2 0.135 0.2 0.1 0.25 0.75
Mean 0.323077 0.338846 0.377692 0.360385 0.202308 0.213462 0.3 0.185357 0.766 0.96875
S. D. 0.416949 0.349277 0.180717 0.249487 0.153449 0.199999 0.278834 0.233928 0.663438 0.777791
Following econometric techniques were used:
 UPVA: Tobit for 4th round data; and Random Effects Tobit for panel data
 OECE: Poisson, Negative Binomial, Zero Inflated Poisson, Zero Inflated Negative Binomial, for the 4th round 
data; and Random Effects Poisson and Random Effects Negative Binomial for the Panel data.
The preferred models for OECE were chosen by using Vuong test, for ZINB vs.  NB, and ZIP vs. Poisson, an likelihood 
ratio test on Alpha=0 for over dispersion for Poisson vs. NB, and ZINB vs. ZIP.  The tests results favored ZINB.
Vickrey OECE




Male vs. Female 0.2958 0.5607 0.6174 0.0288
Informed vs. Uninformed 0.1658 0.3727 0.0000   0.0000
Random Nth Vickrey vs. 2nd price vickrey 0.8061 0.0000
All bids posted vs. N bids & 2 bids posted 0.0509 0.0000
Acknowledgment:
Funding was provided by Federal 
State Marketing Improvement 
Program (USDA)
Contract number 12-25-G-0886
The Authors thank Jill
McClusky and other participants of 
the workshop in Moscoew ID, Fall, 
2009
* Individual income was reported in intervals: (less than $499), ($500-$999), ($1,000 - $1,999), ($2,000-$2,9999), etc.
**Family income was reported in intervals: (l< $999), ($1,000-$1,999), ($2,000-$2,999), … (9,000-$9,999), ($10,000-$14,999), ($15,000-$19,999),… ($40,000-$49,000), (> $50,000) 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Calsson, F., P. Frykblom, and C. J. Lagarkvist, “Consumer Willingness to Pay for Farm Animal Welfare: Mobile Abattoirs Versus Transportation to Slaughter”, European Review
of Agricultural Economics, Vol 34 (3) (2007) pp. 321–344
Corrigan, J. R., and M. C. Rousu, “Posted Prices and Bid Affiliation: Evidence from Experimental Auctions”, Amer. J. Agr. Econ. 88(4)(2006): 1078–1090
Corrigan, J. R., D. P. T. Depositario, R. M. Nayga, Jr., X. Wu, T. P. Laude, “Comparing Open-ended Choice Experiments And Experimental Auctions: An Application to Golden 
Rice”, Amer. J. Agr. Econ. 91(3) (2009): 837–853
Food and Agriculture Organization, “National Dairy Animal Well-Being Initiative: Principles and Guidelines for Dairy Animal Well-Being”, October 2, 20008.  Available on line 
at: http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/animalwelfare/Dairywellbeing_Guidelines.pdfLast Accessed, Sept.  10, 2009
Frank, J., “Process Attributes of Goods, Ethical Considerations and Implications for Animal Products” Ecological Economics 58 (2006) 538– 547 
Knetsch, J. L. and F. Tang, “The Endowment Effect and Repeated Market Trials: Is the Vickrey Auction Demand Revealing?”, Experiment al Economics, 4 :257-269 (2001) 
Liljenstolpe, C., “ Evaluating Animal Welfare with Choice Experiments: An Application to Swedish Pig Production,” Agribusiness, Vol. 24 (1) 67–84 (2008)
List, J., and J. Shogren, “Price Information and Bidding Behavior in Repeated Second-Price Auctions”, Amer. J. Agr. Econ. 81 (1999): 942-949 
Lusk, L. J., and B. F. Norwood, “A Survey to  Determine Public Opinion About the Ethics and Governance of Farm Animal Welfare”, Vol. 24 (1) 67–84 (2008) 
Norwood . B. F., and J. L.  Lusk, “The Farm Animal Welfare Debate”, Choices, 3rd quarter 24(3) 2000
Rousu, M. C., W. E. Huffman, J. F. Shogren, and A. Tegene , “Estimating the Public Value of Conflicting Information: The Case of Genetically Modified Foods “, Land 
Economics, 80(1)(2004): 125-135 
Shogren, J. F., M. Margolis, C. Koo, and J. List. "A Random nth-Price Auction," Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 46 (Dec. 2001): 409-21. 
References
Consumers' Willingness to Pay for Animal Welfare Attributes in Dairy Products: 
Evidence From Experimental Auctions
Levan Elbakidze1, Hao Li1, Rodolfo Nayga2
1 University of Idaho, Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology, 
2 University of Arkansas, Department of Agricultural Economics and Agribusiness
OECE  Vickrey
Zero Inflated Negative 












VARIABLES Ice Cream Cheese Ice Cream Cheese Ice Cream Cheese Ice Cream Cheese
Trust Scores (From 1 to 5) -0.00357 0.230** 0.0739** 0.188*** 0.116*** 0.0621* 0.110*** 0.0271
(0.0629) (0.0952) (0.0303) (0.0366) (0.0317) (0.0320) (0.0304) (0.0291)
Gender (Male=1; Female=0) -0.155 -0.0529 -0.200*** 0.0916 0.00835 0.00131 0.0173 0.0236
(0.139) (0.181) (0.0628) (0.0770) (0.0565) (0.0568) (0.0542) (0.0516)
Age 0.0129* 0.0135 -0.00355 -0.000240 -0.00543* -0.00611* -0.00444 -0.00464
(0.00724) (0.0115) (0.00396) (0.00430) (0.00320) (0.00319) (0.00306) (0.00290)
Education Level (From 1 to 9) -0.0610 0.198*** 0.00858 0.121*** 0.0136 0.00951 0.0232 0.0183
(0.0484) (0.0598) (0.0221) (0.0249) (0.0235) (0.0236) (0.0225) (0.0215)
Personal Income (Dollars) 0.0775 -0.354*** -0.0332 -0.111*** 0.0903*** 0.0549** 0.107*** 0.0556***
(0.0654) (0.100) (0.0264) (0.0317) (0.0223) (0.0222) (0.0213) (0.0202)
Family Income (Dollars) -0.000732 0.0662** -0.00663 0.00880 -0.0115 -0.0217*** -0.0106 -0.0236***
(0.0210) (0.0273) (0.0102) (0.0122) (0.00720) (0.00723) (0.00691) (0.00659)
Consumption Frequency 
(1 to 4)
0.226*** 0.165 0.184*** 0.190*** 0.135*** 0.226*** 0.128*** 0.227***
(0.0800) (0.116) (0.0377) (0.0346) (0.0311) (0.0288) (0.0297) (0.0258)
Familiarity with Agricultural                       
Production (yes=1, no=0)
0.180** -0.188 0.0741* -0.124*** -0.121*** -0.0101 -0.0966*** -0.0635*
(0.0907) (0.125) (0.0406) (0.0469) (0.0379) (0.0393) (0.0364) (0.0356)
Quality superiority
(yes=1; no=0)
-0.276*** -0.366*** -0.243*** -0.294*** -0.0918*** -0.0717*** -0.0971*** -0.0911***
(0.0457) (0.0652) (0.0209) (0.0262) (0.0205) (0.0206) (0.0197) (0.0188)
Time since Last Meal (minutes)  0.0353** 0.0259 0.0354*** -0.00308 -0.0173* -0.0330*** -0.0233** -0.0245***
(0.0174) (0.0233) (0.00778) (0.00992) (0.00987) (0.00999) (0.00945) (0.00900)
Awareness on Animal Welfare   
(Aware=1, no =0)
-0.0238 -0.103 0.0199 -0.0264 0.225*** -0.0335 0.203*** 0.0699*
(0.0883) (0.117) (0.0391) (0.0423) (0.0393) (0.0400) (0.0377) (0.0363)
Animal welfare information 
treatment (yes=1, no=0) 
-0.351*** -0.779*** -0.374*** -0.470*** -0.0549 -0.0611 -0.0562 -0.0659
(0.128) (0.186) (0.0600) (0.0720) (0.0640) (0.0641) (0.0614) (0.0584)
Price of Ice Cream ($ /unit) -0.239 2.717*** -0.346 1.863***
(0.723) (1.024) (0.337) (0.443)
Price of HCH($ /unit) -1.126** -3.284*** -1.029*** -2.894***
(0.520) (0.753) (0.240) (0.310)
All posted or not 
(all=0; two & N posted=1)
0.127 0.224** 0.104 0.170***
(0.0869) (0.0880) (0.0830) (0.0167)
Random Vickrey Auction or not 
(Random N=1; Two Prices=0)
-0.0802 -0.555*** -0.0250 0.164**
(0.0783) (0.0805) (0.0747) (0.0793)
Quantity 0.136*** -0.412***
(0.0174) (0.0723)
Round 0.0512*** 0.0735*** 0.00145 0.00484
(0.0178) (0.0217) (0.00440) (0.00542)
Constant 0.777 0.402 2.008*** 0.558* -0.233 0.327 -0.731*** -0.305
(0.517) (0.690) (0.296) (0.292) (0.245) (0.259) (0.241) (0.242)